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NOTES AND COMMENT
THAT JURY QUESTION, "UNcoNscIoUSNESS"
One defense to imposed liability with which tew are conversant
is a "sudden unconsciousness on the part of an individual at the time
when he is alleged to have been negligent." Should anyone occasion
loss while suffering from an unforeseeable coma, belief by a jury in
the truth of the evidence would excuse that defendant.1 The law
intends what is agreeable to reason-it does not suffer absurdity.
No obligation demands performance of the impossible, and exemption
from culpability extends to any species of a vis major in respect
of which a person lacks a remedy.2  Writers have classified -as the
Act of God events unable to be prevented despite an exercise of
prudent care. Since that term encompasses all misfortunes which
arise from inevitable necessity and which human intelligence cannot
predict or escape,3 it is understandable why irresistible loss of con-
scious power should preclude legal redress.
As we know, Negligence involves whatever improper acting
infringes upon the rights of another and also the failure to do some-
thing which reasonable care dictates, whereby a plaintiff sustains
special damage. 4 For recovery in Negligence, both Misfeasance and
Nonfeasance apply the identical test in determining an omission to
perform legal duty-which standard is represented by the "conduct
of the average prudent man". 5 Liability is a question of fact depend-
ing upon the circumstances which surround the claimed action or non-
action,6 although once Negligence is found to exist as a tort, incom-
petency furnishes no defense in law to exculpate responsibility there-
for.7
Because, however, our "Jural Man" has but ordinary mental
and physical capacity and but ordinary prudence, extraordinary con-
ditions must be considered in passing judgment upon him.8 New
York courts usually restrict the Act of God to natural accidents which
exclude all human agency of any degree-thus differentiating it from
" Rasbach v. Cassidy, 263 App. Div. 1047, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 762 (1942);
Cohen v. Petty, 62 App. D. C. 187, 65 F. (2d) 820 (1933) ; Armstrong v. Cook,
250 Mich. 180, 229 N. W. 433 (1930).
2 CLERK & LINDSELL, TORTS (7th ed. 1921) 453.
3 SALMOND, TORTS (5th ed. 1920) 240.
4 See 45 C. J. 637, Negligence § 15; 38 AM. JURIS. 643, Negligence § 2;
20 IL C. L. 26, Negligence § 19.
5 20 P, C. L. 20, Negligence § 14.
6 See cases cited supra note 1.
7Williams v. Hays, 157 N. Y. 541, 52 N. E. 589 (1899) ; Williams v.
Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449 (1894); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, 150
Misc. 180, 268 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1934).
8 Williams v. Hays, 157 N. Y. 541, 52 N. E. 589 (1899), cited mtpra note 7.
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an inevitable accident which no foresight or precaution can prevent.0
In reference to damage caused by a sudden unpredictable absence of
awareness, it is offered that such is best viewed as an unavoidable
or "pure" accident. Moreover, the defense of instant unconsciousness
is a jury problem,10 and because it pertains to the essence of the
prima facie cause, a complainant ever retains his burden of proving
negligence by a defendant so stricken."
In the case of Williams v. Hays,12 the defense for a ship master's
negligence was an alleged unconsciousness on account of sickness from
a heavy dose of quinine. At the disposition of a former action,' 3 a
defense of insanity on his part was declared insufficient in law, so-
upon retrial, the lower court had directed a verdict for the plaintiff,
and had refused to permit jury deliberation as to whether the mental
and physical condition might have resulted solely from efforts to save
the ship during a storm. Re such defense of mental and physical
incompetence to care for and navigate the vessel, solely in consequence
of efforts to save the vessel during the storm-the judges remanded,
indicating clearly that a question of claimed unconsciousness is one
of fact for the jury. A crystallizaton of the logic in that conclusion
illustrates the following:
(a) An insane person is liable for his torts the same as if
sane. (The question of such liability is one of policy-
namely, that the incompetent should not be supported
at the expense of his neighbors or of the state.)
(b) For what in sane persons is willful or negligent conduct,
the law finds responsibility. If then, the defendant's
conduct would-in sane persons-have been willful or
negligent, the master (despite incompetency) would be
answerable therefor. But should his conduct, even in
a sane person, be able to be determined not willful and
not negligent,--then "a fortiori" this insane person
will not be deemed liable if a jury considers his mis-
feasance to be not willful and not negligent.
(c) The standard of care regardless of a person's sanity or
insanity is that of the "reasonably careful man".
9 Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115, 86 Am. Dec. 292 (1864). But cf. Beiner
v. Nassau Electric Ry., 191 App. Div. 371, 181 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1920), cited
infra note 31.
1o Jernigen v. Jernigen, 207 N. C. 851, 175 S. E. 713 (1934); Myers v.
Tri-State Automobile Co., 121 Minn. 68, 140 N. W. 184 .(1913); cf. cases
cited supra notes 1, 6.
"Under N. Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 242 an unusual defense may be affirma-
tively pleaded to prevent surprising an opponent-but this alone never serves to
shift the plaintiff's "Burden of Proof".
12 Williams v. Hays, 157 N. Y. 541, 52 N. E. 589 (1899), cited supra
notes 7, 8.
1s Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449 (1894), cited supra
note 7.
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(d) However, an IMPOSSIBILITY TO USE DUE CARE, if ex-
istence of such can be found from the facts, will be
permitted to excuse a defendant for failure to exercise
that duty of care.
(e) Dissociating, therefore, the defense of the master's un-
consciousness from the defense of his insanity, the
Court of Appeals demonstrated that alleged uncon-
sciousness is a valid defense and a question for the jury.
The liability of insane persons upon, proof of existence of their
negligence, has been urged on grounds of Public Welfare. The
general rule holds incompetents just as responsible for torts as sane
persons, and applies similarly to all wrongs except those in which
intent is a necessary ingredient. To justify enforcement of this harsh
doctrine, tvo arguments are offered, to wit: that relatives of a lunatic
be induced to restrain him, and secondly so that tortfeasors may not
"simulate or pretend insanity" in explaining their acts which cause
damage to others.14 Professor Burdick has opined that Inevitable
Accident decisions indicate a lurking suspicion as to the soundness
of the Insanity Rule.15 Regardless, however, of repudiation of liability
without culpability in respect to incapacitated persons, sudden im-
probable unconsciousness-if bona fide-will exculpate a defendant.
Rasbach v. Cassidy 16 exhibited that same ultimatum in submission
to the jury of an automobilist's asserted unconsciousness under in-
structions that its existence in fact would negate any negligence.
An analysis of the theory throughout various jurisdictions re-
veals situations where unconsciousness caused by fainting was success-
ful to defend culpability for injury to guests in vehicles.1" Illness
void of pre-accident warning and attributable to a seizure of cramps,
has likewise excused a defendant from liability to a guest,'8 while a
momentary loss of mental control which ends in a collision, can pro-
cure a release from blame when the ascertained facts convince a jury.19
Dozing off, on the other hand, where a defendant continued to drive
after realizing that he was tired, was regarded in Connecticut as no
defense in law 2 0-but, negligence in "simply falling asleep" has been
deemed a jury question.2 ' If Trespass is the issue contested, liability
a4 Id. at 447, 38 N. E. at 450.
1
, BUIcK, LAW Or TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 94, 95.
S16Rasbach v. Cassidy, 263 App. Div. 1047, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 762 (1942),
cited supra notes 1, 6, 10.
17 Cohen v. Petty, 62 App. D. C. 187, 65 F. (2d) 820 (1933) ; Armstrong
v. Cook, 250 Mich. 180, 229 N. W. 433 (1930), both cited supra notes 1, 6, 10.
18 Armstrong v. City of Detroit, 286 Mich. 273, 282 N. W. 145 (1938).
19 Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P. (2d) 553
(1934).
20 Potz v. Williams, 113 Conn. 278, 155 Atl. 211 (1931).
21 Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).
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cannot be found unless an act has been consciously done, and pre-
requisite to any recovery, alleged intent must be proved.
22
Re tort liability for damage to persons not guests, numerous
decisions demonstrate that temporary impotence to regulate one's
motions will constitute a bar to redress if the factual evidence sup-
ports its contentions.23 Canadian authority 24 completely released a
defendant who, upon becoming abruptly ill, lost control of his motor
car and killed an infant pedestrian. The action had been brought
under a statute 25 which conferred rights to ue for death caused by
"wrongful act, default, or neglect." Pursuant to that language,
the negligence required in the case-a conscious act of the defendant's
volition-was only what would accord with the wording, since such
imported intention and inferred a similar standard of care in testing
both civil and criminal blame. Nevertheless, the court elaborated in
ascribing the sickness to an Act of God, and in definitely stipulating
that such an unfortunate seizure would exculpate responsibility. The
exact opposite was held concerning acute indigestion when a Texas
court was led astray by adhering to the insanity rulings.26 It should
always be remembered that our later Williams opinion 27 would have
permitted a jury to allow an impossibility to use due care in excusing
any unconscious defendant from exercising that duty of care.
Viewing the outlook from the angle of foreseeability, unconscious-
ness on the part of an intoxicated plaintiff has been held merely a
remote cause, and not such contributory negligence as would exempt
recovery where the tortfeasor failed to utilize a "Last Clear Chance"
in avoiding the injury.28 But when a defendant victim of vertigo
disregarded the probable consequences, intentionally ran his car at
high speed, and was stricken with a sudden attack whereby third
parties were hurt-that driver was found criminally responsible after
determination by a jury of presence of the required mens rea.29 An
extension of the doctrine of forseeability was seen by the finding
of a valid cause against a father who, knowing his son to be an epilep-
tic, furnished him with an automobile, following which a fit terminated
in harm to guests of the vehicle.30 During an earlier litigation, coma
22 Lobert v. Pack, 337 Pa. 106, 9 A. (2d) 365 (1939).
23 Waters et al. v. Pacific Coast Dairy et al., 131 P. (2d) 588 (Calif.
1942); Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va. 317, 10 S. E. (2d) 887 (1940); Soule v.
Grimshaw, 266 Mich. 117, 253 N. W. 237 (1934); Dishman v. Whitney, 121
Wash. 157, 209 Pac. 12 (1922); accord, Jernigen *v. Jernigen and Myers v.
Tri-State Automobile Co., both supra note 10.
24 Slattery v. Haley, 52 Ont. L. Rep. 95, 11 B. R. C. 1036, 3 Dom. L. Rep.
(x.s.) 156 (1923).25 FATAL ACCIDENTS AcT (R. S. 0. 1914) c. 151.
26 Leary v. Oates, 84 S. W. (2d) 486 (Tex. 1935). But see cases cited
supra notes 10, 23.27 Supra note 8.
28 Herrick v. Washington Power Co., 75 Wash. 149, 134 Pac. 934 (1913).
29 Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41 (1916).
so Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 692 (1941).
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in a trolley motorman could excuse the defendant carrier from liability
in the absence of negligence on its part. 1
As precipitant senselessness requires a jury trial, evidence of an
inducing affliction and its source supported by the reasons such attack
is unexpected, will constitute a valid defense. It would be neither
feasible nor advisable that existence of certain facts, as matter of
law, should spell out blame therefor. Since the facts must lead us
to a finding of negligence, and then the tort of negligence to a con-
clusion of liability, any permission of facts to immediately determine
liability would be to ignore the meaning of Negligence. Our standard
of care is that 'of the "Jural Man of ordinary mental and physical
capacity and of ordinary prudence"--that is-whether or not any
conduct may be called willful or negligent. Further extensions of
the law of Negligence would be unreasonable and abhorrent to all
principles of equity and justice. The fallacy of contrary reasoning
is apparent and cannot and ought not to be sustained.8 2 Where there
has been no lack of proper precautionary prudence nor normal prob-
ability of resulting damage-any "sudden unforeseeable unconscious-
ness" should rightly excuse a defendant.
HARRIET G. SARBACK.
ADMISSIBILITY OF BILLS As EVIDENCE OF VALUE
Among the items of damages, which a plaintiff in a personal
injury or property damage suit seeks to recover, are the expenses
for his medical and hospital treatment and for the repair of his prop-
erty. Almost invariably the plaintiff will have bills for these expenses,
receipted if paid. Let us consider the admissibility of these bills in
such negligence litigation.
Fundamentally, the liability of a negligent tort feasor to one
damaged in property or injured in person through the tort, is limited
to those damages which are the proximate I consequences of the neg-
ligent act. They include the necessary repairs to, or replacement of,
the property, and the treatment of the person, computed as to cost
by the standard of reasonable value.2 This standard of limiting the
amount of the items of damage to their reasonable value is under-
stood by considering the development of the present day negligence
action from trespass-on-the-case and indebitatus assumpsit, in which
31 Beiner v. Nassau Electric Ry., 191 App. Div. 371, 181 N. Y. Supp. 628
(1920), cited supra note 9.
= Williams v. Hays, 157 N. Y. 541, 548, 52 N. E. 589, 592 (1899), cited
supra notes 7, 8, 12, 27.
2 Statler v. Ray, 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1063 (1908).
2 Gumb v. Twenty-third Street Ry., 114 N. Y. 411, 21 N. E. 933 (1899).
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